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Abstract
Central banks are instrumental to shaping and implementing monetary policy in both industrial and
developing countries. They affect exchange rates, interest rates, and the success of private banks within their
home country. Today, the world economy is becoming more globalized with the passing of each day, so
international financial flows are very important to both developing and developed countries. Central banks,
when allowed a degree of independence in policymaking, aid in formulating monetary policy that promotes
economic stability within their respective countries, and create an atmosphere friendly for foreign investment.
A vast amount of research has been devoted to investigating autonomy of central banks in developed countries
and factors that affect their autonomy. This study aims to examine the behavior of central banks in sub-
Saharan Africa and to determine what political factors affect central bank independence in sub-Saharan
African countries?
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Central Bank Independence in Sub-Saharan Africa:
An Analysis, 1960-1989
Megan Presnak
Central banks are instrumental to shaping and implementing monetary policy in both
industrial and developing countries. They affect exchange rates, interest rates, and the suc-
cess of private banks within their home country. Today, the world economy is becoming
more globalized with the passing of each day, so international financial flows are very
important to both developing and developed countries. Central banks, when allowed a
degree of independence in policymaking, aid in formulating monetary policy that promotes
economic stability within their respective countries, and create an atmosphere friendly for
foreign investment. A vast amount of research has been devoted to investigating autonomy
of central banks in developed countries and factors that affect their autonomy. This study
aims to examine the behavior of central banks in sub-Saharan Africa and to determine
what political factors affect central bank independence in sub-Saharan African countries?
Research suggests that a high level of informal central bank independence, as opposed
to legal, or formal, central bank independence is a precondition for macroeconomic stabili-
ty in developing countries (Maxfield 557). Sylvia Maxfield’s research looks closely at the
central banking systems of Brazil, South Korea, Thailand, and Mexico to explain central
bank capacity and behavior in developing countries. Central bank behavior and capacity in
developing countries is determined by government officials, private banks, and industrial-
ists who are in a position to delegate authority to the bank (Maxfield 557). This study will
expand upon Maxfield’s study, using the countries in Africa’s sub-Saharan region to test her
hypothesis. Because many of Africa’s economies are very weak and in the earlier stages of
development, testing Maxfield’s hypothesis in the sub-Saharan region can provide an addi-
tional assessment of her argument.
The geographical region of sub-Saharan Africa is home to a large percentage of the
world’s population, making it very important to include in this study. Due to the low level
of economic development in the region, conservative monetary policy is needed to fight
inflation and increase investor confidence in order to draw foreign direct investment. An
independent central bank is best equipped to pursue a conservative policy track, as it is free
from the pressure of government politicians. Research has found that, in developing coun-
tries, informal central bank autonomy is related to low inflation (Maxfield 557). Does this
hold true for the sub-Saharan countries? Their history of colonial rule and fairly recent
gains of independence make the sub-Saharan cases very different from those of Southeast
Asia and Latin America, and hence worthy of further study.
Discussion on Central Bank Independence
Legality Only Goes So Far
This study considers central bank independence on two different levels, one of legal,
or formal, independence, and one of behavioral, or informal, independence. Political econo-
mists rely on indicators such as government veto over bank policy; government’s ability to
determine appointment, dismissal, and term duration of central bank directors; bank budg-
etary autonomy; policy goals for the bank; performance incentives for bank directors; bank
control over monetary instruments; and limitations on the banks ability to finance budget
deficits in order to determine central bank independence (Bernhard 311). Formal central
bank autonomy is best explained in terms of the legal framework that determines the estab-
lishment and operation of the bank (Goodman 330). Simply stated, in order to determine a
central bank’s degree of legal independence, one can look to the bank’s charter.
Conversely, to determine a central bank’s informal degree of independence, other fac-
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tors are taken into consideration.“A central bank is independent if it can set policy instru-
ments without prior approval from other actors and if, for some minimal time period (say, a
calendar quarter), the instrument settings clearly differ from those preferred by other
actors” (Woolley 13). Central banks that are relatively free from political interference in the
policymaking process are considered to be independent, as their behavior is less restricted
by the government. Political influence over central bank policy is important in that
[i]f political changes reflected changes in basic attitudes toward economic
policy or if they were traumatic and irreversible for the politicians
involved, then the instability would motivate politicians to control the cen-
tral bank tightly and keep it at their disposal to help them stay in power. If,
however, the political changes were alterations in power of two or three
parties that shared a consensus on many basic tenets of economic policy,
then the parties might agree to grant the central bank considerable auton-
omy to pursue price stability, so that the aspect of economic policy on
which they agreed would not suffer from political contests over other
issues (Cukierman and Webb 399).
Essentially, if given the opportunity, a single politician or political party could gain full con-
trol over monetary policy, given a dependent central bank.
Political scientists contend that political parties and politicians act on the desire to
remain in office, and hence, have many reasons to pursue policy that will maintain the sup-
port of their constituents (Bernhard 312). Monetary policy tends be slow-acting in produc-
ing desired outcomes, and sometimes fails to yield the results that it was engineered to pro-
duce. The effects of monetary policy throughout an economy are varied and occur at many
different time intervals (Bernhard 312). For example, a set of monetary policies that is
enacted to combat inflation may end up resulting in a rise in unemployment, along with
cuts in social services that were formerly paid for by the state. Independent central banks
allow policymakers to gather information from policy experts who have access to private
information regarding outcomes of government policies (Bernhard 314). Furthermore, an
independent central bank may help countries gain legitimacy with international creditors.
Many lenders see an independent central bank as an indicator of the government’s commit-
ment to economically sound policy choices (Maxfield 556).
Dependent central banks allow the government to manipulate the policymaking
process, due to the fact that government ministers have the ability to punish central bank
board members by dismissing them from their position (Bernhard 316). Bank board mem-
bers are likely to share the policy preferences of the government in this case, and pursue
policies that yield immediate results as opposed to long term stability (Bernhard 315).
Many studies exist that emphasize the positive relationship between a central bank’s degree
of legal independence and low rates of inflation (Cargill 159). Due to the bank’s independ-
ence, it is able to avoid opportunistic business cycles and promote price stability (Clark and
Hallerberg 324). Looking closer, studies, (refer to Appendix) suggest that legal central bank
independence, while it may be positively related to low inflation in industrialized countries,
does not appear to be related to a low inflation rate in developing countries (Cukierman
and Webb 397).
Developing countries are faced with many factors that affect their inflation rates. The
government’s role is seen as “providing ‘social overhead capital’ or ‘infrastructure’ to facili-
tate economic development” (Krueger 9). Citizens in developing countries look to the gov-
ernment to compensate for market failures, which usually results in populist spending and
debt accumulation (Krueger 10). Politicians nationalize banking institutions and twist mon-
etary policy to benefit themselves and their loyalists, resulting in large scale corruption and
economic policy that cannot be maintained (Krueger 10). Political instability, which is com-
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mon in many sub-Saharan African countries, negatively affects macroeconomic policy and
outcomes, and has been shown to cause rising inflation rates (Cukierman and Webb 398).
The legal independence of the central bank in developing countries tends to differ
from its actual behavioral independence (Maxfield 557). The actual degree of central bank
independence is determined by those who are in a position to delegate power: government
officials (Maxfield 557). The behavorial independence of central banks in developing coun-
tries is determined by the incentives that financial structures impose on industrialists,
politicians, and private financiers, not by the bank’s charter (Maxfield 557). Detailed ratings
of behavorial central bank independence in developing countries are indexed according to
each country’s scores in a number of different categories (Cukierman, et. al 21-22) 2.
The Problem with Reality 3
While informal central bank independence is best measured using a number of fac-
tors, collecting data for many countries is not practical. Instead, turnover of central bank
governors serves as an indicator of actual independence in this study. The rates of governor
turnover from periods shortly after a political transition are compared with turnover rates
from other periods. During periods of heavy political influence, the rate of central bank
governor turnover increases, in both industrialized and developing countries (Cukierman
and Webb 399). Most importantly, governor turnover is far more easily measured than fac-
tors like the number of central bank victories over the government in policy debates. Using
central bank governor turnover as a measure of behavorial bank independence is based on
the assumption that a more rapid turnover rate indicates a lower level of independence.
When governments take the time to choose a new governor frequently, it is probable that
they will appoint someone who will cater to their demands. Conversely, frequent turnover
may reflect dismissal of those governors who disagree with the government.
The use of central bank governor turnover is not an ideal measure, however. A gover-
nor may be allowed to keep his position for an unusually long time simply because he or
she is subservient to the government (Maxfield 560). This tends to be true for countries
with stable authoritarian regimes (Cukierman and Webb 402). It is probable that the tenure
of a bank governor will be shorter than terms served by executive branch members
(Maxfield 560). Because of this, the bank governor will be more open to government inter-
ference and less likely to pursue anti-inflationary policies that take a long time to pay off.
Also, a short term allows the bank governor less time to acquire allies in government who
are opposed to government interference with central bank policy (Maxfield 560). There are
cases in which governments are dedicated to financial stability, in which case they would
tend to allocate considerable policy autonomy to the central bank governor. Cukierman, et.
al’s pioneering study in this area indicates that governor turnover has little bearing on bank
independence in industrialized countries, but acts as good indicator in developing countries
(29).
Institutional Origins…Do They Matter?
In developing economies, central banks are most often born out of necessity to serve
the financial needs of the government, private banks, and industrialists (Maxfield 563).
Maxfield suggests that two key variables shape the emergence of central banks in develop-
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2 A reproduction of the index questions, values, and weights appears in the Appendix of this paper in
Table 2.
3 This section draws heavily on Cukierman,Webb, and Neyapti’s “Measuring Central Bank Independence
& Its Effect on Policy Outcomes,” pages 13-19.
ing countries: the nature of private financial markets, and the sources of public finance
(Maxfield 563). When governments need extra financing, weak central banks are estab-
lished that give the government considerable freedom in manipulating monetary policy.
Once the bank is created, it is difficult to change its structure, so it tends to reinforce the
current state of the economy (Henning, 55). Hence, when a weak central bank is created
and allows the printing of more currency, inflation increases and it is harder to develop a
strong private financial sector. Inflation, in turn, tends to increase and results in economic
troubles.
The greater the internal debt of a country, the more likely it is to have a dependent
central bank (Maxfield 564). When the government deficit is low, the financial institutions
and industrialists will take the lead in pushing for a strong independent central bank that
can create and maintain economic stability (Maxfield 564). Inflation is more costly in a
country with developed markets, so businesses and private banks prefer a conservative
monetary policy. Private banks also rely on the central bank to keep them afloat during
economic down turns with loans, reduced reserve requirements, or other regulations
(Maxfield 565). It is important to note that even with a dependent central bank, a country
“may still enjoy price stability if it consistently pegs its currency to that of a country with
stable prices” (Cukeriman and Webb 398). However, this assumption is not always correct
or sustainable. While pegging a country’s weak currency to another’s strong currency has
been shown to slow hyperinflation and stabilize exchange rates, it severely limits a country’s
monetary policy options (Haque).
The monetary crisis in Argentina is an example of how currency pegs can harm a
country’s economy in the long run. Because Argentina adopted a dollar peg in the 1980s to
“quell fears of inflation and capital flight,” the country was unable to follow suit in 2002
when one of its main trading partners, Brazil, devalued its currency (Haque). Argentina lost
its competitive edge in regional trade, and in turn, socio-political crisis took hold in the
country (Haque). Furthermore, when a country adopts a currency peg system, it appears
more stable to outside investors, which attracts foreign investment. These countries, newly
equipped with international credit, will be tempted to pursue a policy of domestic spending
and borrowing (Caprio and Honohan 47). The debts that result from nearly unchecked
borrowing in these countries become unsustainable and lead, in many cases, to the collapse
of the currency (Caprio and Honohan 47).
Following will be both the methods and empirical data to test these assumptions in
the case of sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s sub-Saharan countries provide a sample of some of
the most underdeveloped countries in the world in which the political and economic deter-
minants of central bank independence can be tested.
Looking at Central Bank Independence
Macro-level Examination: Sub-Saharan Africa
This article will begin by examining informal and legal independence of central banks
in eleven sub-Saharan African countries. Countries included in this study are: Tanzania,
Kenya, Zaire, Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Botswana, Zambia, Ghana, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe. The degree of legal central bank independence is determined by a number of
factors. Each factor is weighted appropriately and then added into a composite score that
represents the degree of formal independence enjoyed by the central bank 4. The compos-
ite score for legal independence will be compared with the average rate of central bank gov-
ernor turnover. Cukierman, et. al provide statistics for average central bank governor
turnover in their study (17-19). Bivariate analysis will then be run on the two indexes of
central bank independence to determine whether or not legal independence determines
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actual central bank independence in the sample of sub-Saharan African countries.
It should be noted that due to differing dates of independence, not all countries in the
sample have data for all of the years being considered in this paper. Observations begin in
1960 and end in 1989, as those are the years covered in the index of central bank autonomy
(Cukierman, et, al 17-19). The data collected with regard to bank independence was
acquired through direct contact with the banks in each country. To find data for the period
from 1990-1999 would require contacting the central banks of each sub-Saharan African
country in the sample and asking them a battery of questions. Unfortunately, due to time
constraints, that kind of extension is not possible for this article.
This paper will also examine the relationship between legal central bank independence
and the rate of inflation in the sub-Saharan African sample. The statistics for average rate of
inflation will be calculated from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International
Financial Statistics Yearbook. Inflation will be calculated to give an average rate per decade
to coincide with bank independence figures. Aside from the relationship between legal
independence and inflation, bivariate analysis will be used to examine the relationship
between actual independence and inflation to see which type of independence serves as a
better indicator of inflation rates for the sample. The aggregated data for developing coun-
tries shows that as governor turnover increases, so does the rate of inflation (Cukierman, et.
al 29). It is expected that this will hold true for sub-Saharan African countries as well.
Central banks are institutions that are born out of necessity. Using average internal
deficit, this study will examine the relationship between debt and central bank independ-
ence in the sample. Internal deficit is determined using total government revenue less total
government expenditure, divided by total government revenue 5. Internal deficit will be cal-
culated for each country in the sample, then, using bivariate analysis, will be compared with
both actual and legal central bank independence. It is expected that the greater the internal
deficit of a country, the less actual independence the central bank will enjoy (Maxfield 564).
Looking at the deficit statistics before the establishment of the central bank in each country
should give insight into the amount of legal independence that the bank will be granted.
Micro-level Explanations: Case Studies
There are many other factors that determine the degree of independence that a central
bank enjoys (Bernhard 311). In order to address these factors more thoroughly, two case
studies will be examined. Through the examination of the two cases, this study will be able
to give a more complete picture of what kinds of political factors affect central bank inde-
pendence in sub-Saharan Africa. The case studies will enable this article to address a num-
ber of issues, both political and economic, that affect central bank independence.
Using Eckstein’s “most likely” and “least likely” observations, two countries have been
chosen to examine as case studies in this article (King, et. al 209-210). Tanzania and
Zimbabwe will be studied closely as illustrations of the different political factors that affect
central bank autonomy in sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania ranks highest in legal central bank
independence in the sample, while Zimbabwe has earned the lowest legal independence rat-
ing. What will make the examination of these two case studies more interesting is the fact
that they share very similar average rates of governor turnover. This seems to run contra-
dictory to Maxfield’s claim that legal independence fails to predict actual independence
(557). In both Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the study will address issues that cannot be ade-
quately explained using an index.
The examination of these two cases will begin with an overview of the political and
economic climate prior to the establishment of the central bank. Banking structures before
the establishment of the central bank will be taken into consideration, as well as govern-
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ment policies whose existence affects the bank’s autonomy in policymaking. During colo-
nial rule, many countries in sub-Sahara found that they were dependent on a regional
authority to issue currency and, hence, lacked considerable control over their own mone-
tary policy (Harvey 3-4). The transition from a regional banking authority to an internal
central bank presented individual governments with the opportunity to control monetary
policy in a way many had not experienced. Most sub-Saharan countries enjoyed economic
stability, as they were under direct colonial rule until the 1960s. The post-independence
period, unfortunately, was a time of economic transition and experimentation with mone-
tary policy that proved detrimental to the majority of these states.
Aside from gaining independence, sub-Sahara countries inherited governmental sys-
tems from their former rulers. Therefore those in power had little experience with Western
forms of government (Harvey 6-7). Struggling to maintain power and prove their regimes
to be legitimate, the new African rulers often resorted to violence and attempted to gain
direct control over as many elements of society as possible. It seems as though central
banks in sub-Saharan Africa stood little chance of enjoying independence. This study will
trace the histories of both countries, in relation to monetary policy to see what kinds of
events tended to affect the degree of independence enjoyed by their central banks. Drawing
on the observations from Tanzania and Zimbabwe and from the macro-level data collected
from the sub-Saharan African sample, conclusions will be made with regard to what types
of political and economic factors affect central bank independence in the region.
Explanations for Variance in Central Bank Independence: Illustrations
Empirical Evidence
In order to examine empirically the factors that affect central bank independence in
sub-Saharan countries, this study employed bivariate analysis in testing the various correla-
tions. The results from the analyses were expected to affirm Cukierman, et. al’s, and
Maxfield’s findings. However, in most instances they failed to do so. Admittedly, the small
number of cases that were tested affected the study’s ability to produce statistically signifi-
cant findings. Though not statistically significant, the findings directed this study to other
possible explanations for the variations in central bank autonomy within the sample.
The first relationship examined was that of legal central bank independence and actual, or
informal, central bank independence. After running bivariate tests to determine the Pearson
coefficient, it was found that no statistically significant relationship exists between the two.
Correlations for Legal Independence and Informal Independence (Governor Turnover)
The lack of a significant relationship reinforces both Cukierman, et. al’s and Maxfield’s
assertion that a central bank’s legal independence does not necessarily affect its informal
independence in monetary policy formation. Though a central bank’s charter may grant it
complete autonomy from the government, reality might tell a different story. The central
bank governor may be faced with losing his/her position if they fail to comply with the
desires of those in powerful positions within the government (Bernhard 311).
The assumption that a higher rate of central bank governor turnover signals a lower
level of informal central bank independence rests on the idea that conflict exists between
the central bank governor and the individuals within the government (Cukeriman, et. al 13-
16). Furthermore, the threshold of governor turnover above which independence begins to
decline significantly is between 0.2 and 0.25 changes per year (Cukierman, et. al 16). Of the
eleven countries represented in this study, only four have average governor turnover rates
that fall above this threshold. However, looking at these countries’ histories on an individual
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basis, it is hard to imagine that their central banks all were able to enjoy a considerable
amount of independence.
Low governor turnover can, in a stable authoritarian regime, be unrelated to informal
central bank independence (Cukierman and Webb 402). Simply stated, central bank gover-
nors under authoritarian regimes are less likely to stand up for a conservative monetary
policy they wish to pursue if it runs contradictory to the government’s policy desires. These
central bank governors are less assertive because they can be dismissed easily and replaced
by someone who will act in a friendlier manner to the government. In many cases, central
bank governors in these authoritarian countries have strong ties to the government and act
in a subservient manner throughout their tenure. Interestingly, of the eleven countries
examined in this study, seven are characterized as being authoritarian (Cukeriman and
Webb 418-419). Their low governor turnover rates may not be associated with informal
central bank independence. In order to assess informal central bank independence in these
countries, an in-depth study is required.
Another problem with using governor turnover to predict informal central bank inde-
pendence within the sample is the fact that central bank governor turnover is also viewed
as being a result of political transition (Cukierman and Webb 403-404). In the sub-Saharan
sample, many of the countries examined did not experience political transition or elections
during the time period being considered. Zimbabwe, for example, had the same president
for the entire period of this study. Immediately following post-independence, most sub-
Saharan states instituted repressive one-party rule (Chabal 292). Characteristically, one-
party states allow for little in the way of actual political transition. Though the bivariate
analysis of legal and informal central bank independence reinforces Maxfield, and
Cukierman, et. al’s findings, it should be kept in mind that perhaps governor turnover is not
an appropriate measure of informal central bank independence in the sub-Saharan sample.
This study also examined the relationship between central bank independence and
inflation rates. Neither legal nor informal central bank independence was shown to have
any correlative relationship with inflation.
Correlations for Central Bank Independence and Inflation (CPI)
Again, the correlation tests failed to produce any statistically significant results, and hence,
the study cannot assume a relationship exists between central bank independence and
inflation in the sub-Saharan sample. This runs contrary to Cukierman, et. al’s, and
Maxfield’s conclusions that high informal independence leads to low inflation rates in
developing countries (Cukierman, et. al 43-44). During the period examined in this study,
the central banks in most sub-Saharan African countries were relatively young and lacked
the capacity to protect banks from government intervention (Harvey 14). This lack of
capacity also diminished the banks’ ability to implement inflation-fighting policy.
Furthermore, due to a lack of industrial infrastructure, these countries relied on the
export of primary commodities while having to import any manufactured goods
(Biermann and Wagao 89). Basing their entire economy on primary commodities left these
countries open to shocks on the world market. It was considered the job of the government
to compensate for any “market failures” that occurred (Krueger 9). This created dependent
central banks which were eventually tied to an economic policy that was unworkable
(Krueger 9). As governments were expected to provide for their citizens during times of
economic hardship, the “lender of last resort” function of many central banks was being
abused. This, in turn, could be associated with rising inflation as more currency was put
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.071 (legal independence) .771
.206 (informal independence) .397
into circulation to compensate for market failures.
Most central banks in sub-Saharan Africa were established in the 1960s, at the same
time these countries were gaining their independence. Opinion at the time favored central-
ized economic planning as the best route to development (Harvey 14). Hence, many coun-
tries in the sub-Sahara adopted an economic model that included government planning of
the economy after independence. The establishment of central banks within an environ-
ment of central economic planning limited their autonomy considerably for obvious rea-
sons. If the government ministries were responsible for economic planning, the process
would have already been politicized. Direct government planning of the economy, as was
the case in Tanzania, provided for government ministries to plan the economy and formu-
late policy while remanding the central bank to the position of advisor (Bank of Tanzania).
The central banks placed in such a position were given the job of implementing mon-
etary policy that was effectively handed down to them by the state ministries in charge of
planning (Bank of Tanzania). While central bank governors may have seemingly been legal-
ly independent, in that they advised the government on monetary policy, they lacked infor-
mal independence because they had to implement a monetary policy that was handed
down to them. This may account for the observation that informal central bank independ-
ence and inflation rates were not negatively correlated during the period observed.
The final relationship examined in this paper was that of government deficit and both
legal and informal central bank independence. Again, the results of bivariate tests for corre-
lation failed to reinforce Maxfield’s findings that higher government deficits tend to rein-
force less independent central banks (563-564).
Correlations for Government Deficit and Central Bank Independence
Neither correlation was statistically significant and showed very weak Pearson’s coefficients.
The lack of relationship may also be a function of the relative weakness of central banks as
a result of central economic planning. Governments, instead of allowing central banks
additional independence, may have chosen to implement a different monetary policy to
keep the bank in its previous position of policy-implementer. The many political and eco-
nomic complexities that affected central bank independence in sub-Saharan countries after
independence can best be explored through a case study. The following section of this study
examines the cases of Zimbabwe and Tanzania in order to gain a better understanding as to
what kinds of elements actually affected central bank independence in the sub-Sahara.
These cases should aid in drawing conclusions and presenting questions for further
research.
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: a Legally Weak Central Bank
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s (RBZ) legal independence ranks among the lowest
in the sub-Saharan sample being examined in this article. The RBZ is also characterized by
an extremely low rate of governor turnover, which according to the literature either signals
a high level of informal independence, the existence of an authoritarian regime, or a very
complacent central bank governor. This may seem to be a confusing case, but a closer look
will clarify the RBZ’s level of autonomy within the Zimbabwean economy. Zimbabwe was
not granted formal independence until 1980, but their pre-independence history helps to
provide a meaningful explanation for the RBZ’s level of informal independence.
Zimbabwe was a British colony prior to 1980 and was administered through a govern-
ment comprised mainly of white settlers, leaving the native population subject to white
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minority rule (Harvey 3). The financial sector was dominated by foreign-owned private
banks. However it was relatively better developed than markets in other African countries
(Harvey 3). In 1956 a central bank was established for the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, the region that included Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia at that time) (Harvey
3). The early establishment of a central banking mechanism in the region laid the ground-
work for Zimbabwe’s future central banking institution. By 1960,“Zimbabwe had both a
variety of financial institutions, and established markets in government paper and equities”
(Harvey 4). In 1963, however, the Federation disbanded and the bank then became the
Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, and would continue to serve the region that is now Zimbabwe
(Harvey 4).
The functions of the Bank of Rhodesia were outlined in its charter, and continued to
govern the RBZ after independence. Originally, the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which
replaced the Central African Currency Board, was assigned the responsibility of issuing
currency in the Federation (BIS 244). When the Federation broke up, the Bank of Rhodesia
took over its functions in Rhodesia and was given the sole right to issue currency within
the country (BIS 244). The Bank’s functions also include assisting in the formation and
implementation of monetary policy, as well as acting as an economic advisor to the govern-
ment. In addition, the Bank serves as a “banker’s bank” and lender of last resort to the gov-
ernment. The RBZ has limited autonomy from the government and its governor is appoint-
ed by the state president. The remainder of the Bank’s governing board includes two deputy
governors, and seven executive directors who represent key sectors of the economy, all of
whom are appointed by the state president.
In 1965, Ian Smith led the white settler government in Southern Rhodesia to declare
unilaterally independence from British rule (Jenkins 582). As a result of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI), the United Nations imposed sanctions on the regime,
which failed to gain international recognition (Davies and Rattsø 4). The sanctions, in turn,
forced the government to amend its economic policy accordingly. Borrowing from abroad
was no longer possible, so the government in Southern Rhodesia was forced to focus devel-
opment inward and rely on domestic resource mobilization (Harvey 4). The sanctions ush-
ered in a policy of import-substitution and economic diversification, which proved success-
ful in promoting GDP growth (Davies and Rattsø 4). It was also during this period, due to a
limited amount of foreign exchange, that a set of rigid exchange controls were implemented
to prevent capital flight (Harvey 4).
Before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the government had signed the
Lancaster House Agreement, which limited the extent to which they would be allowed to
implement the full socialist policy they desired (Jenkins 580-581). The Lancaster House
Agreement mainly protected white investment in Zimbabwe, which comprised the majority
of the economy (Jenkins 580-581). During the first few post-independence years, the gov-
ernment of Zimbabwe pursued a very non-interventionist monetary policy in order to
avoid driving investment and white business out of the country (Harvey 4-5). During this
time the import-substitution system created during the UDI was continued, but the growth
it created became unsustainable on foreign exchange grounds (Davies and Rattsø 4). In
response, foreign exchange allocations were imposed to balance the account deficit, which,
in turn, restricted growth (Davies and Rattsø 4).
Zimbabwe entered independence with the legacy of white dominance, which left the
majority black African population yearning for a solution to the immense inequality that
enveloped the country (Jenkins 581). The new government was expected to address the
staggering inequalities while avoiding economic ruin in a country that was far better devel-
oped than its neighbors. The new administration was dependent on white experience, as
black Africans had been excluded from all forms of government until independence
(Jenkins 581). The dominance in policy debates by whites was illustrative of the fact that
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the new administration lacked control over its economic policy, and hence remained largely
unable to implement its socialist development plan in the early years of independence
(Jenkins 581). Eventually, the new government had decided to pursue an expansionist mon-
etary policy that earned them growing budget deficits (Bautista, et. al 15).
The new Zimbabwean government took action in putting its socialist ideas into prac-
tice, as most other post-independence African leaders had done (Jenkins 583). State-
planned, highly interventionist development strategy caused monetary policymaking to be
politicized. Because of the nature of the new economic policies, it is probable that the RBZ
was essentially acting as an instrument of the governing party. Before 1985, the govern-
ment’s new expansionist monetary policy had resulted in the money supply nearly doubling
(Bautista, et. al 15). Furthermore, because international sanctions had been lifted and
Zimbabwe was internationally recognized as a sovereign nation, the government was able to
borrow from foreign creditors. This practice caused Zimbabwe’s external debt to increase
more than three-fold (Bautista, et. al 15). Around the same time, the government granted
heavy public subsidies to transport and marketing facilities. These were put in place to
guarantee that certain “controlled commodities” could only be bought and sold at prices set
by the government (Bautista, et. al 15-17).
Surprisingly, the Zimbabwean government did not choose to nationalize commercial
banks within the country in accordance with its socialist ideas (Harvey 9). However, a poli-
cy of increased public spending was introduced. Free access to healthcare and heavily subsi-
dized education were created, along with a progressive tax system (Davies and Rattsø 16-
17). The government claimed its dedication to economic stabilization, but defended its wel-
farist spending while decreasing spending on capital (Davies and Rattsø 17-18). The new
policy of government spending on public services caused the economy to suffer, as industry
was not built up. This instance clearly demonstrates the government’s hand in controlling
the RBZ. If left on its own to fight inflation and create a strong economy, the bank would
not have pursued such a welfarist policy.
The party in power after Zimbabwe gained its independence was the ZANU Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), led by Robert Mugabe, who remains in power today. During the mid-
1980s ZANU-PF began to consolidate power and centralized the formulation of economic
policy (Jenkins 587). The new centralization of power in creating economic policy found
the Prime Minister (later to become President), the Minister of Finance, Planning and
Development, and the Minister of Industry and Commerce in charge of formulating eco-
nomic policy in Zimbabwe (Jenkins 588). Granting additional responsibility to the central
government in economic policymaking worked to the exclusion of the central bank. In the
late 1980s it was apparent that the government’s isolationist economic policies were work-
ing to the detriment of the manufacturing sector (Jenkins 589-590). Industrialists, helped
with the involvement of the World Bank, began to push for economic liberalization
(Jenkins 590).
A struggle both within the government and between the government and the industri-
alists/World Bank ensued. Two camps formed within the government, one, that included
the central bank governor and board realized the need for liberalization and the other
which included Mugabe and the ideologues, preferred to maintain a closed economic policy
(Jenkins 590). Eventually, the central bank won out, as it had the backing of the World
Bank. By 1990 the World Bank’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was
instituted in Zimbabwe (Jenkins 590). The authoritarian structure of the Zimbabwean state,
however, continued to contribute to the central bank’s dependent status. Mugabe insisted
that he needed to be consulted before any ministerial decisions were made (Jenkins 592).
The stringent financial regime of the 1980s created an artificially low interest rate in
Zimbabwe, and hence inflationary pressures were not felt as much as would have been
expected (Bautista, et. al 22).
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In the 1980s, Zimbabwe was characterized by large budget deficits and very low levels
of foreign direct investment (Bautista, et. al 22). The central bank’s hands were tied by the
structure of the Zimbabwean state. Any form of dissent within the governing structure was
met with dismissal from one’s post. This policy included the central bank because the board
and governor were all appointed by the head of state (Jenkins 592). Oppressive laws in
Zimbabwe allowed the government to maintain control over nearly every facet of society. In
a country where civil society is largely lacking in freedoms, the central bank stands little
chance in pursuing policies that run counter to the government’s desires. This was the case
in Zimbabwe, explaining its low formal independence rating, and low governor turnover
rate expected from an authoritarian state.
The Bank of Tanzania: a Legally Strong Central Bank
Compared to the RBZ and the central banks of other countries in this sub-Saharan
sample, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) enjoys a very high legal independence rating. The
BOT was also characterized by a very low rate of governor turnover during the time period
this study covers. Tanzania gained its independence in 1961, and from that time until the
mid-1980s the Tanzanian government chose to pursue a socialist model of economic devel-
opment (US Dept. of State). The BOT’s experience under a socialist system was a unique
one as it was one of the earlier African countries to gain its independence. Therefore it will
be an interesting to compare with the RBZ, as Zimbabwe was one of the last African coun-
tries to gain independence. Despite the fact that their index of legal independence falls
completely opposite one another, the BOT and the RBZ enjoyed almost identical levels of
governor turnover.
Prior to the BOT’s establishment, Tanzania’s monetary policy was strictly controlled by
Britain, using the East African Currency Board (EACB) (Coulson 274). The EACB ensured
that inflationary pressures were kept in check by issuing “local currency only if an equiva-
lent amount of foreign exchange was deposited in London” (Coulson 274). While the EACB
was able to control domestic economic expansion, it did not have policy in place to prevent
massive capital outflows. Capital control policies were not instituted until 1965, after
Tanzania had already attained formal independence (Coulson 274-275). Julius Nyere, in
1961, was elected President of Tanzania and would remain in office until 1985 (US Dept. of
State). Nyere took office and found Tanzania as a country with stark inequalities due to the
fact that infrastructure was only developed to aid in extractive export-oriented colonial
industry. This left many who lived in non-productive regions extremely poor (Klugman, et.
al 80).
Because Tanzania and other East African countries had formally been granted inde-
pendence, their governments moved to break up the EACB and separate central banks were
established in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda (BOT). In 1966 the Bank of Tanzania was
established pursuant to the breaking of the EACB. With authority granted from the govern-
ment, the BOT “issued currency, performed the function of banker to the government
(which meant it could lend to the government), policed the exchange controls, and (some-
what later) operated a strict system for licensing imports” (Coulson 275). Only a short time
after its establishment, the BOT was left to redefine its role within the Tanzanian economy
as a result of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 (Coulson 176). The government knew that in
order to successfully pursue its socialist goals, it would need to synchronize central bank
functions to follow socialist principles, while keeping commercial banks from pursuing
their own capitalist goals (Mittelman 602).
The Arusha Declaration changed Tanzania both internally and with regard to its inter-
national reputation. Tanzania was actively pursuing a socialist development strategy and
was frequently grouped with countries like Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam
(Coulson 176). Nyere’s Arusha Declaration suggested a lack of faith in democracy, and led
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Tanzania to establish a one-party state (Coulson 177). It was also in 1967 that President
Nyere announced that all private and commercial banks in Tanzania were to be national-
ized (Mittelman 600). The government of Tanzania, under the Declaration, would play a
direct role in controlling the economy (Mittelman 602).“The assets and liabilities of seven
foreign and two local banks were taken over and vested in a wholly government-owned
corporated — the National Bank of Commerce (NBC)” (Mittelman 600). The Arusha
Declaration and the legislation that called for the nationalization of private banks and
establishment of the NBC in Tanzania did not designate how the central bank was to work
with the new state-owned establishments (Loxley 123).
The government’s objective in nationalizing private banks was to extend the monetary
sector of the economy to those who, until then, had been forced to live off of subsistence
farming (Mittelman 601). Unfortunately, with the creation of new powerful financial insti-
tutions in the Tanzanian economy, the BOT was left to “adapt its behavior as it saw fit, sub-
ject to broad policy directives being issued from the Ministries (Loxley 123). The BOT,
however, remained in existence beside the NBC, which was almost unheard of in a socialist
economy that would usually assign all banking functions to one large bank controlled by
the state (Loxley 123). Due to the socialist path chosen by Nyere, the BOT stood little
chance of enjoying a large degree of informal independence from the state.
It was the belief of the government that in order for a successful transition to social-
ism to take place, it needed to control monetary policy almost completely. Tanzania’s form
of central planning “spelled out in money terms the detailed implications of the physical
plan” (Loxley 123). With a set monetary policy that was dictated by the government,“the
need for a separate institution having as its main function the formulation and implemen-
tation of macro-monetary policy as we know it in Western capitalist economies totally dis-
appeared” (Loxley 123). The NBC, because of the system of extensive government econom-
ic planning, was capable of absorbing most of the “purely banking functions” of the BOT, as
they no longer were subject to the BOT’s discretion (Loxley 123).
The new economic policies signaled a move away from international patrons, like
Germany and Britain, which made investors and creditors skeptical about Tanzania
(Mittelman 603). In addition to the socialist ideas of the government, this turned develop-
ment and economic policy further inward to focus on domestic issues. The role of the BOT
changed from one of carrying out its original functions to one of assisting in government
economic planning (Loxley 124). The BOT was looked to as a body that could forecast the
results of certain policy objectives, and hence was able to help plan monetary policy (Loxley
124). Still, because the government was ultimately given the last word in this system, the
independence of the BOT was severely limited throughout the 1960s. At the same time, an
ideological split was growing within the governing party pitting ideological socialists
against their pragmatic counterparts (Klugman, et. al 81).
The pragmatic socialists agreed with the ideology of socialism, but pushed for a more
liberal economic policy, which differed from the policy of ideological socialists (Klugman,
et. al 81). Unfortunately for the BOT, the ideological socialists dominated the party in
power, and increased their control over the state’s economy throughout the 1970s
(Klugman, et. al 81). Simultaneously, Tanzania’s debt began to grow, due to a lack of export
diversification which limited the amount of foreign capital flowing into the country
(Biermann and Wagao 89). The “Tanzanian decision-makers failed to achieve self-sustained
growth as the essential precondition for any pattern of development-capitalist or socialist”
(Biermann and Wagao 90). Eventually, the government began to decentralize itself and
allotted increasing amounts of political power to groups throughout the country (Klugman,
et. al 83).
Market and pricing decisions remained centralized during the 1970s, but were affected
by external shocks that included war with Uganda (Klugman, et. al 86). The centralization
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of these functions still did not appear to affect the independence of the BOT in policymak-
ing, as it still existed beside the NBC. With or without the NBC, the BOT still would have
been secondary to the Ministry of Development and Planning, as they decided on policy
during the 1970s (BOT). In 1978, the Bank of Tanzania Act, that laid the groundwork for
the BOT’s functions, was amended to give the bank more development functions to oversee
(BOT). Also, the planning functions of the Ministries were shifted to the BOT, which
allowed the BOT to oversee the other banks and financial institutions in Tanzania (BOT).
As the 1970s drew to a close, bilateral aid was cut drastically to most Third World
countries, forcing Tanzania to approach the IMF in order to obtain development aid
(Biermann and Wagao 91). The IMF responded to Tanzania with a Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) that carried with it certain conditions to be fulfilled. The IMF had asked for
Tanzania to pursue economic liberalization strategies, as it had with many other countries
at the time (Biermann and Wagao 93). The BOT found itself in a position to accept a loan
from the IMF, but the government failed to introduce policies that adhered to the condi-
tions, and the IMF pulled its funding (Biermann and Wagao 93). As the 1980s continued,
the economic situation in Tanzania deteriorated, leaving the country with few options other
than to accept the IMF’s SAP and its conditions (Biermann and Wagao 94). In 1986,
Tanzania finally reached an agreement with the IMF to implement an Economic Reform
Program (Klugman, et. al 89).
Tanzania’s economic failures during the 1980s were largely the fault of inappropriate
government policies. Government parastatals, extensive state controls over production, an
overvalued exchange rate, and reduced incentives to the private sector all contributed to the
downturn in the 1980s (Klugman, et. al 89-90). The existence of such disastrous economic
policies implies a lack of informal independence for the central bank in Tanzania. The
members of the Board of Directors for the BOT are appointed with the government’s
advice and include government ministers (BOT). Though the BOT may have enjoyed a fair
degree of legal independence, the policies of a socialist regime limited its informal autono-
my greatly.
Conclusions
The evidence presented in this article suggests that the legal autonomy of a central
bank in sub-Saharan Africa cannot solely account for its policymaking capacity. On the
other hand, the measure of informal independence, central bank governor turnover,
appears to have little explanatory power with respect to bank capacity. Neither measure of
independence was able to explain variation in the level of inflation, so this study implies
that further research must look elsewhere in order to explain fluctuation in inflation rates.
A different measure of informal central bank authority would provide a good starting point
for studying the effect of central bank authority on rates of inflation in sub-Saharan Africa.
The cases examined in this article suggest that in order to understand the informal authori-
ty of a central bank in the sub-Saharan sample, one must consider the political context in
which the bank exists.
This study also found that the level of government deficit had little power in explain-
ing variation in informal central bank authority. The sample of sub-Saharan countries
examined in this study does, however, provide interesting cases that warrant further study.
Their legacy of colonial rule and relatively recent dates of independence left the sub-
Saharan African countries to formulate a development strategy in a globalizing world.
These countries, while many attempted to pursue protectionist policies during their early
economic development stages, were eventually forced to open to the world economy. The
vast inequalities that colonialism left behind were seen as something that needed to be
remedied by post-independence regimes. Because many governments adopted policies of
redistribution and populist spending, central banks were left with little control over such
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politicized economic policy.
A larger sample of countries would have been helpful in conducting this study, as it
was difficult to obtain significant results from a group of only eleven countries. Also, many
of the countries examined in this article lacked data for a number of years that were consid-
ered. If complete figures were available for government expenditure and revenue, as well as
for consumer price index, then this study could possibly have produced more significant
results. This study suggests that when studying institutions, financial or governmental, sub-
Saharan African cases cannot be lumped together with the whole of the developing world.
Comparatively, African countries have fairly young institutions that were adopted from
their colonial rulers after independence. Such institutions did not fit in to the traditional
idea of leadership in African society, which was based on local units (Friedman 3).
Government authority, in these largely authoritarian regimes, usurped the power of the
central bank in fighting inflation and pursuing a conservative monetary policy. To effective-
ly study the level of informal central bank autonomy in sub-Saharan Africa, detailed case
studies are needed in order to address the various factors that affect it. As these countries
continue to develop and rid themselves of authoritarian regimes, governor turnover may
serve as a valid indicator of informal central bank independence. Until that time, alternative
methods must be devised to study variations in informal central bank independence in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Appendix
Table 1
Regressions of Legal Central Bank Independence and Informal Central
Bank Authority on Inflation (1950-1989)
*From Maxfield’s 1994 “Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing Nations.”
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Industrialized Countries Developing Countries
Legal independence -0.06 0.01
Significance level 5% not significant
T-statistic -2.54 0.11
Informal authority -0.08 0.28
Significance level 10% 1%
T-statistic -1.81 4.80
6 Independence ratings for countries with data missing for the 1970s have been computed using the
averages for the decades preceding and the decades following the missing decade where possible.
Table 2
Index of Informal (Actual) Central Bank Independence
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Variable Number Variable Description Weight Numerical Coding
1. Tenure overlap w/political authorities 0.10
Little overlap 1.00
Some overlap 0.50
Substantial overlap 0.00
2. Limitations on lending in practice 0.20
Tight 1.00
Moderately tight 0.66
Moderately loose 0.33
Loose or nonexistent 0.00
Country Legal Independence Rating Informal Independence Rating 
Botswana .33 .41
Ethiopia .40 .20
Ghana .36 .28
Kenya .44 .17
Nigeria .37 .19
South Africa .25 .10
Tanzania .44 .13
Uganda .38 .34
Zaire .39 .23
Zambia .38 .38
Zimbabwe .21 .10
3. Resolution of conflict 0.10
Some clear cases of resolution in favor of bank 1.00
Resolution in favor of government in all cases 0.00
All other cases 0.50
4. Financial independence 0.10
a.) Determination of the central bank’s budget
Mostly central bank 1.00
Mixture of executive or legislative branches 0.50
Mostly legislative or executive branches 0.00
b.) Determination of the salaries of high bank 
officials and the allocation of bank profits 
Mostly by bank or fixed law 1.00
Mixture of bank and executive or legislative branches 0.50
Mostly executive or legislative branches 0.00
Average .36 .23
Table 3
Index of Legal (Formal) Central Bank Independence
*From Cukierman et. al’s “Measuring Central Bank Independence & Its Effect on Policy Outcomes.”
For a more detailed explanation of weighting, please refer to Cukierman, et. al, pages 6-9.
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5. Intermediate policy targets 0.15
a.) Quantitative monetary stock target 
Such targets exist and are usually met 1.00
Such targets exist: mixed adherence 0.66
Such targets exist: poor adherence 0.33
No stock targets 0.00
b.) Formal or informal interest rate targets 
No 1.00
Yes 0.00
6. Actual priority given to price stability 0.15
First priority 1.00
First priority assigned to a fixed exchange rate 0.66
Price or exchange rate stability are among the bank’s 
objectives, but not first priority 0.33
No mention of price or exchange rate objectives 0.00 
7. Function as a development bank, granting credit at 
subsidy rates? 0.20
No 1.00
To some extent 0.66
Yes 0.33
The central bank is heavily involved in granting 
subsidized credits 0.00
Variable Number Description of Variable Weight
1. Chief executive officer 0.20
a.) Term of office
b.) Who appoints CEO?
c.) Dismissal
d.) May CEO hold other offices in government?
2. Policy formation 0.15
a.) Who formulates monetary policy?
b.) Resolution of conflict
c.) Role in the government’s budgetary
3. Objectives 0.15
4. Limitations on lending to the government 0.50
a.) Advances
b.) Securitized lending
c.) Terms of lending
d.) Potential borrowers from the bank
e.) The limits on central bank lending are determined by:
f.) Maturity of loans
g.) Interest rates on loans must be:
h.) Is the central bank prohibited from:
*Table reproduced from Cukierman, et. al’s “Measuring Central Bank Independence & Its Effect on
Policy Outcomes,” pages 21-22.
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